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BUDGETARY PRIORITIES IN A CRISIS 
STATE: SHIFTS IN IRANIAN 
GOVERNMENT ALLOCATIONS 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 
ABSTRACT 
The ability of the Iranian economy to provide viable jobs for the coWltry 's rapidly growing population will, in the 
long rwi, be largely dependent on the ability of the coWltry to upgrade its stock of human capital. An analysis of 
Iranian Government budgets starting in 1970 indicates a steadfast commitment of the government to funding 
education. In fact, despite revolution, war, and political change the government has managed to maintain the 
budgetary share allocated to educational expenditures. 
On the other hand, since the fall of the Shah there has been a dramatic shift in the composition of the educational 
budget towards primary education and away from secondary and university training. In this regard, it is hard to 
see major increases in growth occurring in the longer term Wlless the government is willing to alter its priorities 
towards increased funding of more advanced and technical training. 
Introduction 
As it enters its second decade, the Iranian revolution would appear to be at an important 
and uncertain point - not because it seems to be in imminent danger of collapse or 
overthrow, but because many of the issues it confronts remain unresolved and the cost of 
failing to resolve them is rising. The war with Iraq only exacerbated these problems. 1 
However, as Clawson2 has observed, the country has faced a set of circumstances 
remarkably unfavorable to its economic growth - the oil price decline (and later collapse), 
the Iraqi invasion, and the departure of many professionals and entrepreneurs in 1979- 80. 
At the same time, the governrnent 's basic political decisions, such as continuation of the war 
with Iraq, few concessions to those traditionally tied to the West and a policy of thorough-
going lslamicization have created grave complications. 
Most evident are the economic problems: high inflation (over 60 percent in early 1988) 
and unemployment; continued mass migration to the cities despite early attempts to reverse 
this trend; underproduction and inefficient utilization of industrial capacity. Much as the 
regime has been able to stave off its problems, it will be more and more difficult to ignore 
them, not least because of the demographic explosion in Iran: from a population of 10 million 
in 1900 to 28 million in 1966 to47 million in 1986 and to an estimated 65-70 million in 2000.3 
The ability of the country to deal wit these problems will, in the long run, be largely 
dependent on its ability to upgrade its stock of human capital through the provision of 
education and training. The purpose of this paper is to present the results of some recent 
empirical findings on Iranian budgetary priorities. Has educational expenditure been a 
casualty of the war and revolution? And if so in what sense? Have the governrnent's 
allocations to the educational system been biased in any particular way? And if so how do 
the current regime's budgetary priorities toward education differ from those of its predeces-
sor? 
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Education 
The first serious attempts at eradicating illiteracy in Iran were undertaken in the 1930s 
under Reza Shah. However, a coordinated push to improve the fundamental skills of the 
population was not undertaken until the 1960s when a mass campaign was instituted under 
a Literacy Corps program as part of the then Shah's White Revolution. A great deal was 
achieved in a short time and by 1979 the literacy rate has improved substantially, to 55 
percent for males and 30 percent for females, accounting for over 40 percent of the 
population. According to the 1986 census, 62 percent of those of school age or above were 
illiterate. 4 
Enrollment rates have show,fairly steady increases over time, especially in the primary 
grades. However, these rates appear to have leveled off at the secondary level with male 
enrollment rates in the mid-l980s actually lower than in the mid-1970s. As a basis of 
comparison, Iran lags considerably behind other countries with similar levels of income/ 
development in terms of enrollment rates at the secondary level. 
Following the revolution, the educational system was changed so that all teaching 
conformed to Islamic principles as ordained by the regime. Great emphasis was given to 
ensuring that the young would be brought up as totally committed Muslims. In some ways, 
the quality of education was improved. However, higher education presented the govern-
ment with continuing problems since the universities, especially the main two institutions 
in Teheran, were, by traditional standards, politically liberal and secular. They were closed 
for a long period, reopening in 1983 with modified Islamic syllabi and a controlled intake 
of "acceptable" students.~ 
Iran has been in almost total intellectual and literary isolation since the revolution. At the 
present time, ideas, literature and new scientific advances from outside penetrate only slowly 
into the Iranian system as a result of attitudes, policies, and, recently, a shortage of financial 
resources. The fact that over 50 percent of the population is under 15 years of age means that 
the imprint of Islamic education is very powerful, since a part of the population has 
experienced no real schooling "other than of the Islamic Revolutionary type. This has 
occurred simultaneously with a contraction in higher education.6 
In the wake of the revolution, there was a significant outflow of people and capital from 
Iran, the former even more damaging to the country's future prospects than the latter. Most 
of those Iranians who fled the country in the years 1978 to 1980 were professional people, 
industrial capitalists, landowners and experienced administrators or technocrats. These 
groups represented many years and even generations of expensive and time-consuming 
training and education. For all its faults, this stratum of society possessed the skills necessary 
for running what was becoming an economically sophisticated state. The mark of this loss 
is still instantly apparent in present-day Iran. 
Employment 
The employment situation in Iran during the last decade or so has been one of extremes. 
During the boom period of the a serious shortage of labor existed in certain key sectors. 7 At 
that time, up to one million Afghan immigrants were attracted into agriculture and general 
labor in Iran, while many Iranian migrants to the Gulf states were induced by the prosperous 
conditions in Iran to return to their homes. • 
Collapse of the economy after 1976 brought on growing but generally modest levels of 
unemployment as the level of activity fell off, especially in construction and services. Young 
males who had often been employed in multiple shift work occupations found work less easy 
to come by, and new immigrants were not absorbed into the labor force on the previous scale. 
Much distress at this time arose from the fall in disposable income among the manual 
laboring groups as they faced rapidly increasing prices for their essential needs. 
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In the period before and after the revolution, what appeared at first to be a gradual decline 
on the employment front became a severe deterioration. 8 The causes of the problem were 
varied. Flight by factory owners, continuing migration of rural people to the towns, 
shutdown of major construction projects and displacement of people in the war zone all 
added to the government's difficulties. By 1986, it was admitted that some 3.8 million of the 
adult workforce of 13.3 million were unemployed, up from three million in 1984. At the time 
of the 1986 census, only 20 percent or so of the population was gainfully employed. 
The work-force was forecast to grow from 11.6 million in 1982 to 13.2 million. by 1988, 
when the number of men seeking active employment would total 11.1 million, compared 
with 2.2 million females. Data on the distribution of the work force are weak. The Plan 
Organization suggested in 1982 that 34 percent of those in active employment were in 
agriculture, 31 percent in manufacturing, mining, construction, and utilities, and 35 percent 
in services. 
Those figures mislead in the sense that large areas of disguised unemployment exist in all 
sectors. Most farming activity is confined to the warm months of the year. Industry retains 
many workers in employment for welfare purposes. Services is an all embracing term 
covering people in low productivity occupations such as cigarette selling and similar 
activities. Given continuing poor economic conditions and a high rate of entry into the labor 
market, unemployment can only get worse despite the dedication of the republic to full 
employment. 
There was an attempt in the first National Assembly to introduce a new labor law that 
would have regulated employment closely and guaranteed very high levels of security to 
workers. By implication, it might also have made workers' councils responsible on a much 
wider scale for the management of their factories. The legislation was rejected by the council 
of Guardians of the Constitution and did not become law, although the opportunity arose in 
1988 to resuscitate the law. 
A number of workers' councils still control individual factories, running them for their 
own benefit, though in most cases with notable lack of commercial success. Only in the small 
factories sector, where there has been management input from the young revolutionary 
cadres, has there been major success using new management structures. Trade unions on the 
Western model do not exist, although consideration for workers under Islamic rules is 
fostered. 
The Budget 
In response to falling oil revenues, afterthe revolution the government generally adopted 
a fairly orthodox policy. The government deficit as a percentage of GDP has been limited 
by continuing and drastic fiscal measures to between seven and eight percent of GDP or just 
about the same levels as the year before the revolution. Exceptions were when oil income 
fell steeply in 1981-82 and 1986-87, when the deficit reached 10-11 percent of GDP. 
The method by which the Government curtailed its deficit constitutes the most stringent 
measure its domestic economic poiicy.9 There has been an extraordinary shrinking of 
government expenditures in real terms. SpecificaUy, actual expenditures - not just the 
budget - fell from 2.5 trillion rials the year before the revolution (1977-78) to 1.4 trillion 
rials five years later in 1982-83. In terms of its share of GDP, the reduction in government 
expenditures over this period from 1977-78 to 198183 was 18 percent (from 46 percent to 
28 percent) Even worse, this was during a period when real GDP fell. 
This reduction would seem to be among the most rapid and far reaching experienced 
by any government since such data began to be collected systematically after World 
War II. No industrialized nation has ever been able to reduce expenditures in any five 
year period by as much as five percent ofits Gross Domestic Product(GDP) The much 
applauded efforts of Latin American governments to cut spending in responding to the 
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debt crisis were much more modest than Iran's response to its own crisis; indeed the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been criticized for demand expenditure 
reductions that were as high as 10 percent of GDP.10 
Over the past five years, the ratio of current and development (fixed investment) 
expenditure to the total indicates that between 80 to 90 percent of current government 
expenditure consists of salary payments to civil servants and procurement of consumer 
goods, and only the remaining 10 to 20 percent is used as a means of implementing various 
economic policies. 
It is also apparent that the government's efforts to check current expenditures over the past 
few years have not been successful, with its ratio to the total expenditures going up to nearly 
75 percent in 1987/88. 
The war expenditure in tum fell into two categories: current and development. Develop-
ment expenditure consisted of such things as the construction of air raid shelters and other 
non-active defenses. In recent years, total war expenditure to total government expenditure 
went up from 32 percent in 1986-87 to more than 34 percent in 1987-88. 
Obviously, the rise in current expenditure in recent years has automatically reduced 
development expenditures and, as a result, investments for employment and the possibility 
of increasing the economic productivity potential. 
With regard to specific categories, educational expenditures while declining in absolute 
terms, were able to stay around 20 percent of total government expenditures over the 1980-
86 period. Economic expenditures fell from 24.0 percent of the budget in 1980 to 15.7 in 
1986. It should be noted, however, that although falling in absolute terms, the 19.6 percent 
of the budget allocated to education was considerably higher than its share in the 1970s. 
Clawson correctly notes, however, that Islamic Iran's expenditure reduction should be 
seen against the background of the oil boom. To a large extent, the Islamic Republic simply 
returned to the level of government that had prevailed until 1973. Reducing expenditilre is 
always difficult, but it may be less so when the program cut is of relatively recent origin. 
Furthermore, much of the reduction was in development spending, which is estimated to 
have fallen in inflation adjusted terms by 80 percent from the pre-revolutionary past. 
Reducing expenditures on such development projects as roads, power plants or factories is 
relatively simple; as on-going projects are completed, work on new projects is postponed. 
Costs of the War 
There is no doubt that the war has profoundly distorted Iran's economy, quite apart from 
the incalculable human cost which includes more than a million dead and injured and 
between one and two million displaced persons. The fact that Iran has not published detailed 
national statistics since 1977 means that any attempt to estimate the cost of the war is 
extremely difficult. The difficulty is compounded because each estimate selects different 
components of cost and thus is not comparable with the others. Furthermore, the estimates 
refer to different time periods. 11 
As Joffe and McLachlan12 note, annual estimates of the costs of the war show similar 
variations. In financing the war, Iran is thought to have been constrained by lack of foreign 
exchange-especially since the 1986 oil price collapse. The result was to limit its expenditure 
on arms during the last several years of the Gulf War to $2-3 billion annually. 
While the costs of the war were staggering, when seen in historical context they do not 
appear to have altered budgetary priorities to a significant extent. Surprisingly, defense 
expenditures during the first eight years of the war were kept at levels approximating those 
under the Shah. The low expenditure during the war was due to three factors: (a) the 
government's inability to obtain sophisticated and expensive equipment, (b) greater reliance 
on voluntary forces, and (c) a reluctance to impose austerity on the public. 
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Budgetary Trade-offs Involving Education 
Before any assessment can be made of the country's ability (and willingness) to maintain 
or even improve its stock of human capital, some idea must be gained as to the factors 
affecting the government's expenditure decisions. To what extent did the Gulf War affect 
educational expenditures? Has education been a priority of the Revolutionary government? 
Are other budgetary categories cut only after reductions in the educational budget? 
When public policy demands exceed the available public resources, budgetary trade-offs 
are bound to occur between and among different policy areas: one policy area may gain at 
the expense of other policy areas in the allocation of scarce resources. Budgetary trade-off 
patterns range on a continuum between two extremes. For example, in the case of defense 
expenditures and allocations to education, it may be that allocations to defense come at the 
expense of educational spending; that is, as defense spending increases, spending on 
education may actually decrease, producing a negative trade-off. 
This pattern is sometimes referred to as a substitution effect. 14 A positive trade-off occurs 
if defense spending increases are matched by real increases in education spending. Of 
course, it is always possible that defense spending bears no relationship negative or positive 
to education spending, producing a pattern in the middle of the trade-off continuum - no 
trade-off. 
What literature exists, 15 suggests that the defense/education trade-off is complex, and may 
be affected by a number of factors including: changes in regime (military/civilian authori-
tarian/democratic), wars/regional conflicts, austerity measures/budget deficits and foreign 
exchange shortages. Some or all of these factors must be included in the regression equation 
to obtain less biased estimates of any trade-offs between education and other categories of 
government expenditures. 
Based on the discussion above- it is clear that several factors had a potential effect on 
the share of educational expenditures in the government budget: 
l. The Revolution. The change in regime type from monarchy to Islamic republic is 
likely to have shifted priorities toward education, although this factor may be 
somewhat different depending on whether the level of education is primary, secon-
dary or university. 16 
2. The Iran-Iraq War. This would seem to be a pure guns-vs-butter situation, with the 
government reducing its commitment to education to divert resources to the war 
effort. 17 
3. Government Fiscal Deficit. This factor could work in either direction, depending 
in part on the priorities of the government towards the educational sector. Larger 
deficits may have been run to maintain educational programs or larger deficits to 
finance other expenditures may have forced the government to reduce allocations to 
education as part of an austerity program. 
4. Sectoral Priorities. This factor includes the guns-vs-butter analogy discussed 
above. However, educational expenditures could be affected (positively of nega-
tively) by movements in any of the ottier major budgetary categories. In addition to 
education, the budgetary1s data presented by the International Monetary Fund for Iran 
include: (a) general public services, (b) defense, (c) health, (d) social security and 
welfare, (e) housing, (t) community services and (g) economic services. 
To summarize in other words we might expect the share of the government budget 
allocated to education to be greater: (a) the smaller the deficit, (b) during peace time, ( c) after 
the revolution and ( d) in the absence of other strong budgetary priorities. Because it appears 
that the current government treats allocations to primary education in a somewhat different 
manner from its funding of secondary schools, analysis was also undertaken on the funds 
allotted to each type of school. 19 
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Main Findings 
In regard to the budget allocated to all expenditures on education:20 
1. The fiscal deficit was by far the most important variable affecting the share of 
educational expenditures in total government expenditures. This variable accounted 
for over sixty percent of the fluctuations in the educational share of the budget. It 
appears that the government was willing to increase its deficit in order to maintain 
the level of instruction. 
2. The major budgetary trade-off was a positive one, and involved the association 
between education and the catch-all category of "other services". A positive, albeit 
weak, cqrrelation was also found with general public services. 
3. As anticipated, the revolution introduced a new set of budgetary priorities, with 
education's share of the budget increasing in relative significance (but not necessar-
ily in absolute terms) after the overthrow of the Shah. 
4. As anticipated, the war took its toll by significantly decreasing the share of funds 
allocated to the country's educational efforts. 
In general, therefore, education suffers from no really serious negative trade-offs with the 
to budget allocations, and therefore should ceteris paribus increase in relative importance 
in the post-war years. It should be noted, however, that a fairly weak but negative trade-off 
with economic expenditures was found. This variable will be examined more thoroughly 
below, since it may provide some insights as to possible shortfalls to education during the 
period of post-war reconstruction. 
In regard to the factors affecting the share of the budget allocated to primary education: 
1. As was the case with total education, the fiscal deficit was the most significant factor 
affecting the budgetary share allocated to primary education. This variable accounted 
for over one half the fluctuations in primary education's share of the budget over the 
1970-86 period. 
2. The revolution's emphasis on primary education is apparent in its contribution to the 
regression equation - increasing the explained variance by nearly 40 percent, a 
much greater incremental increase than in the case of total education. 
3. The major budgetary trade-off was a negative one with the catch-all category "other 
services". Apparently the Islamic regime provides a certain type of services not 
available under the Shah. These services have expanded in part at the expense of 
primary education. 
4. Interestingly enough, primary education has such a high priority with the present 
regime that the war does not appear to have seriously affected its relative position in 
the budget. 
5. As noted with total education, a weak and negative trade-off exists with economic 
expenditurer.. Since economic expenditures consist of such a diverse group of 
activities, this budgetary category is examined in greater detail below. 
For secondary education, a much different pattern emerged: 
1. Apparently the government was unwi!Jing to incur larger budgetary deficits simply 
to fund this type of activity - the fiscal deficit was insignificant when regressed on 
the share of secondary education in the budg~t. 
2. Other social expenditures were the strongest determinant of secondary education's 
share of the budget, with the war reducing the share offunding for this type of activity. 
3. It is also interesting to note that the change in budgetary priorities associated with the 
overthrow of the Shah may have actually resulted in a reduction in the relative 
importance of secondary education. This relationship is fairly weak however, and 
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probably does not reflect a major bias of the current regime against secondary 
education per se. 
4. Finally, the percentage of variance on the share of secondary education explained by 
the model is considerably lower than was the case with either total or primary 
education. In part, this most likely reflects a weak commitment by the government 
to instruction at this level. 
One of the more interesting (and surprising) findings from this analysis was the role of the 
budget deficit in funding primary and (since it is comprised mostly of primary education) 
total education. To determine the relative importance of education in this regard, additional 
regressions were run with the deficit as dependent variable. Other budgetary shares were 
included along with the Revolution term and the Iran-Iraq War dummy variables. The results 
of this exercise indicated that: 
1. Education (either total or primary) was the only budgetary category associated with 
increases in the deficit. In fact, increases in the share of funds allocated to education 
accounted during the period under consideration for over seventy percent of the 
increase in the fiscal deficit. 
2. The revolutionary regime appears slightly more disposed than its predecessor to run 
deficits, but this effect is not particularly strong. 
3. Contrary to the situation in most countries, the war does not appear to have had much, 
if any, effect in increasing the size of the deficit. 
4. Substituting the share of the budget allocated to defense for the war term also does 
not enable one to account for the increase in the deficit in recent years. In fact, the 
defense term has a positive sign, indicating that higher levels of defense expenditure 
are actually associated with lower deficits. 
It appears, therefore, that both the Shah and the Islamic leaders gave a high enough priority 
to (primary) education so as to be willing to risk the inflationary impact usually associated 
with increased budgetary deficits. No other sector appears to have been elevated to this status 
by either regime. 
It was noted earlier that a slight negative budgetary trade-off was found in the regressions 
of the share of economic activities in the budget upon education (both total and primary). 
Further analysis was undertaken to determine, through disaggregating to the various 
components of economic expenditures21 , the extent of this relationship. Building from a 
three-variable model containing the deficit, the Iran/Iraq War and the revolution, the various 
economic categories were added on a one-by-one basis. The results indicate that: 
l. Both total economic services and those involving mining, manufacturing and 
construction had a negative but weak effect on the shares of the budget allocated to 
either total education or primary education. 
2. The greatest impact from the economic portion of the budget was the fairly strong 
negative impact of fuel and energy on.primary education. · 
Conclusions 
Since seizing power, the Islamic regime has been able to maintain, if not significantly 
increase, the country's stock of human capital. Most likely, this has come at some cost in 
terms of inflation, and perhaps resources that could have been allocated more effectively in 
the higher levels of training. With the completion of the war, the country's focus will most 
likely tum to increasing its investment in its younger citizens. It is unlikely that, at least at 
the primary level, education will face major problems in maintaining its budgetary share, 
despite the increasing economic costs associated with reconstruction. Increases in the 
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absolute amounts of resources allocated to both activities should help revive the economy. 
However, it is hard to see major increases in growth occurring in the longer term unless 
the government is willing to alter its priorities towards increased funding of secondary and 
university level education. There is no evidence to date that this will be the case. 
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